Abstract-This paper investigates the incentive mechanism design from a novel and practically important perspective in which mobile users as contributors do not join simultaneously and a requester desires large efforts from early contributors. A two-stage Tullock contest framework is constructed: at the second stage the potential contributors compete for splittable reward by exerting efforts, and at the first stage the requester can orchestrate the incentive mechanism to maximize his crowdsensing efficiency given the rewarding budget. A general reward discrimination mechanism is developed for timeliness sensitive crowdsensing where an earlier contributor usually has a larger maximum achievable reward and thus allocates more efforts. Owning to the lack of joining time information, two practical implementations, namely earliest-n and termination time, are announced to the contributors. For each of them, we formulate a Stackelberg Bayesian game in which the joining time of a contributor is his type and not available to his opponents. The uniqueness of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) is proved in each strategy. To maximize the requester's efficiency, we compute the optimal number of rewarded contributors in the earliestn scheme and the optimal deadline in the termination time scheme. Our contest framework is applicable not only to the closed crowdsensing with fixed number of contributors, but also to the open crowdsensing that the arrival of contributors is governed by a stochastic process. Extensive simulations manifest that with appropriate reward discriminations, the requester is able to achieve a much higher efficiency with the optimal selection of the number of rewarded contributiors and the termination time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the rapid proliferation of smartphones and wearable devices. They are equipped with a plethora of multi-modal sensors and they possess powerful computation as well as communication capabilities. With these technological features, ordinary mobile users can actively monitor their surrounding environments such as temperature, noise, vibration, network connectivity and geographic position without demanding sophisticated instruments. This leads to a new paradigm of problem-solving known as participatory crowdsensing: a requester releases sensing tasks and collects contributed data from a number of mobile users that seek their individual benefits or the benefit of their community. Recent applications in [1] , [2] , [3] , [19] adopted crowdsensing to perform the indoor localization, collection of location information and noise monitoring, etc.
The efficacy of a crowdsensing system heavily relies on the exerted efforts of mobile users. However, they are reluctant to share sensing capabilities due to the cost of energy, data traffic, time consumption, and risk of privacy leakage etc. A large body of studies have been devoted to developing efficient incentive mechanisms [4] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [25] , [26] that can be roughly classified into two representative types: all-pay auction [4] , [23] and Tullock contest [20] , [25] . In the former, the requester usually plays the role of auctioneer, and each contributor bids his efforts to the requester. The winning contributor acquires the entire reward, while the efforts of a losing contributor cannot be reimbursed. The latter approach, unlike all-pay auction, splits the total reward to all the contributors exerting positive efforts. Each contributor receives a fraction of the reward proportional to his efforts, and inversely proportional to the aggregate collected efforts.
Incentive mechanisms based on auction theory are in general perfectly discriminatory, i.e. the best bidder wins the competition while the others lose for sure [25] . Owing to fear of sunk cost, all-pay auction is inclined to discouraging the participation of relatively weak contributors [24] . In the light of its potential limitation, [20] proposed to utilize Tullock contest to maximize the total sensing time of contributors. Tullock contest is partially discriminatory so that each contributor gains a positive reward at the equilibrium if he exerts positive efforts. Though serving as a salient incentive mechanism for crowdsensing, the standard Tullock contest can be far away from optimality when the contributors are heterogeneous in their marginal costs of effort. Authors in [25] presented an optimal discrimination strategy for Tullock contest when the marginal costs of the users are heterogeneous in crowdsensing. The basic rationale is to enable a user of smaller marginal cost to exert more efforts under a Bayesian game framework.
In this paper, we consider partially discriminatory incentive mechanisms at a new regime, namely timeliness sensitive crowdsensing contest (TSCC). This is motivated by versatile real-world crowdsensing applications where the timely sensing results are more valuable to the requester. For instance, CityExplorer [15] is a game-based crowdsensing system in which a winning player sets as many markers as possible in a city-wide game area within a finite time period by taking photos and providing concrete information. OpenSense [7] enrols users to perform real-time air quality monitoring at different sites of a city. TruCentive [16] , CrowdPark [17] and ParkNet [18] collect the timely parking information from drivers and distributes to those in need of it. NoiseTube [19] is a participatory sensing framework for monitoring ambient noise in an area of several square kilometers.
Though the above systems are designed for different purposes, they share a set of similar properties. Firstly, the contributors do not join instantly and simultaneously, while the requester desires large efforts from those who joins the sensing earlier. The joining time can be the timestamp of a mobile user passing by a given sensing venue, assuming that the task is announced at time 0. Secondly, the contributors do NOT exert efforts to change the joining times; in stead, they contribute efforts to execute the specific task. For instance, a driver will not drive his car out solely for the purpose of finding the availability of a parking lot. Executing a task such as taking and uploading photos consume a certain amount of resources. The cost of altering the joining time overwhelms that of task execution so that the joining time of the contributor is deemed as his property instead of his strategy to gain a larger share of the reward. Hence, the joining time and effort of a contributor are two orthogonal factors. To incentivize more efforts from early contributors, a naive approach is to raise the reward, which is obviously not desired by the requester. From this angle, a fundamental question arises: can the requester incentivize more efforts from early joining contributors by designing appropriate discrimination mechanisms other than increasing his budget for crowdsensing?
To answer this question, our first step is to examine in what form a feasible discrimination strategy should take so as to maximize the requester's efficiency under the Tullock contest model. Here, the efficiency is defined as the aggregate weighted efforts brought by per-unit of the requester's budget. This metric shares the similar principle as those in [20] , [25] , but is more general than a specific utility function. We model the competition of contributors as a noncooperative game. Each contributor selfishly maximizes his payoff that is the difference between the received reward and cost of efforts. Our analysis on the unique Nash equilibrium (NE) reveals that the reward discrimination along with a "virtual nature contributor" can leverage the requester's high efficiency and the simplicity of mechanism design: the reward discrimination endows an early contributor the larger maximum achievable reward, and vice versa; the nature player enables the requester to retain a fractional of reward when the number of contributors is small, thus improving his efficiency.
Once Tullock contest structure has been determined for crowdsensing, our second step is to design practical incentives with timeliness sensitivity. Two practical approaches are proposed, the earliest-n strategy where only a subset of earliest contributors are rewarded, and the termination time strategy that any contributor later than a "deadline" will be ruled out in this sensing task. In both strategies, they compete under an incomplete information scenario because each of them only knows his own joining time, while is unaware of those of the others, or is impossible to predict the joining times of future players. Hence, we formulate each competition as a two-stage Stackelberg Bayesian game, in which the requester announces the contest function to the contributors at Stage-I and they compete for the reward with the probability distribution of joining time at Stage-II. The existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) are proved for each strategy.
Based on these BNEs, the requester can compute the optimal number of rewarded contributors for the earliest-n strategy and the optimal deadline for the termination time strategy.
Our major contributions are summarized below:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to explore the design space for incentivizing more efforts from the early joining contributors.
• We show that the reward discrimination is suitable to elicit more efforts from early joining contributors. The NE of the Tullock contest is analyzed where a set of practical discrimination strategies are proposed to give preference to the early contributors.
• We formulate Stackelberg Bayesian Nash games for the earliest-n and the termination time strategies. The optimal number of rewarded contributors in the former and the optimal deadline in the latter are presented.
• The Stackelberg Bayesian Nash game framework is generalized to the open crowdsensing system where the arrival of contributors is governed by a Poisson process.
• Extensive simulations manifest that the proposed strategies can greatly improve the efficiency of the requester. In particular, the distribution of joining times for the closed system is derived from the WiFi access data of students in a campus building. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Second II presents the game model for participatory sensing with the timeliness consideration. A set of practical incentive strategies are proposed in section III. Section IV analyzes the Bayesian Nash equilibria of incentive strategies and presents the optimal parameter configurations. Section V extends the game framework to an open crowdsensing system with Poisson arrival of the contributors. The trace-driven experiments are performed in Section VI. Section VII reviews the state-of-the-art work and Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present a suit of game models for participatory sensing that take into account the joining time of contributors.
A. Motivation and Basic Model
In most of crowdsourcing and mobile sensing applications, the requester pursue not only high quality but also timely efforts. However, recent research merely concentrates on the quality or effort while assuming that all the contributors participate in the crowdsensing simultaneously. In reality, the contributors more often join asynchronously. To harvest more efforts from the early joining contributors, the requester can increase the monetary reward, which is obviously undesirable. Our purpose here is to explore the design space for incentivizing timely and large efforts without increasing the requester's reward. The timeliness sensitive crowdsensing contest (TSCC) possesses two key factors, one is the joining time and the other is the exerted effort. The joining time is the duration between the instant of task distribution and that of task completion. We make an important assumption as the following.
Assumption 1: The joining time and effort of a contributor are perfectly complimentary factors in the crowdsensing contest. The effort refers to various types of resources used to perform a sensing task, excluding those related to joining time. The joining time of a contributor is determined exogenously.
This assumption manifests that the joining time and effort CANNOT be confused together. As an example, in mobile sensing applications, the joining time can be the timestamp of a mobile user passing by the given sensing site, and the effort refers to energy expenditure or even monetary cost to execute this task. A rational contributor will decide how many efforts he should spend on the sensing task, knowing his joining time.
In what follows, we deliver the mathematical model for the incentive mechanism design.
We consider a crowdsensing system with one requester and N potential contributors. The requester releases a task at time 0 with a reward budget B, and the contributors compete for this reward. We denote by e i the effort made by contributor i, and by t i his joining time. Define two vectors e and t as e = {e i }
. The core of crowdsensing is the reward allocation mechanism that incentivizes the high effort from contributors, by taking the timeliness into consideration. We adopt a modified Tullock contest success function (CSF) to characterize the competition among contributors. Define
) be the reward obtained by the i th contributor, given the sets of joining time t and effort level e. There has
where b(t i ), the maximum achievable reward of contributor i, is a function of his joining time t i . In this Tullock crowdsensing contest, each contributor shares the total reward proportionally to his efforts, and inversely proportional to the aggregate efforts from all the contributors. The physical interpretation is that a contributor acquires a larger reward if he contributes more efforts, and a smaller reward if any of his opponent spends more. Two new features are introduced beyond the standard Tullock model. One is the "reward discrimination" on the joining times, that is, b(t i ) ≥ b(t j ) if t i < t j . An early joining contributor has a larger maximum achievable reward than a late one To be noted, there are two other discrimination rules named "weight discrimination" and "exponent discrimination". However, only the reward discrimination is suitable for our problem where we leave the lengthy analysis in Appendix-II. The other feature is to introduce a constant e 0 that if it is positive, the reward will not be completely assigned to the contributors. If e 0 is 0, when there are only a couple of contributors, the requester has to assign the whole reward even though a very small amount of efforts are collected. Actually, a non-zero e 0 is equivalent to adding a NATURE player, avoiding such adverse situations. A larger e 0 means that the requester retains a higher percentage of reward. Denote by R the total reward paid to the contributors:
In the incentive mechanism design, the requester needs to make the payment R equal to the budget B as the benchmark. The payoff of contributor i, π i , is denoted as the difference between his reward and the cost of efforts. Hence, there yields
where the marginal cost of efforts is normalized as 1. When t i is not included in the CSF, we can rewrite
for simplicity. Concerning the requester's utility, an immediate contribution is no longer identically important to a late one, even if their efforts are the same. Inspired by this observation, we transform the importance of timeliness to the requester into a positive weight w i (t i ) (sometimes simplified as w i ) for contributor i. If t i < t j , there has w i ≥ w j . Define U as the utility of the requester:
Define E as the requester's efficiency that is the utility brought by per-unit payment:
The efficiency E reflects the amount of utility brought by per-unit reward, and E serves as the metric of the requester to quantify the performance of incentive mechanisms. Using E instead of U provides an intuitive understanding on how good an incentive mechanism can achieve. An auxiliary metric is named as "discrimination gain" denoted by G = E d /E nd where E nd and E d indicate the requester's efficiencies without and with discrimination. In what follows, we formulate two different games to understand the competition of contributors, and explore the requester's utility maximization strategy. Remark 1: We consider a single requester because it is less likely that two requesters compete simultaneously over the same set of mobile users.
B. G1: Complete Information of Joining Times
We formulate a noncooperative game to characterize the competition of contributors in which the joining time is the common knowledge. In practice, when a contributor exerts certain efforts, he only knows his own joining time, while not those of his opponents. However, the complete information game allows us to gain important insights of the incentive mechanism design in a more tractable way. The game G1 comprises three key elements:
• Players: A set of N potential contributors;
• Strategies: The action of player i is e i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N ;
• Payoffs: The payoff of player i is π i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Each player selfishly maximizes his individual payoff. The outcome of their competition is depicted by the famous Nash Equilibrium as the following.
Definition 1: (G1 Nash Equilibrium) The strategy profile e * is a Nash equilibrium of G1 if there exists
where e * −i is the set of efforts excluding e * i . Definition 2: (Individual Rationality) Each player will receive a nonnegative payoff if he exerts a positive amount of efforts.
C. G2: Incomplete Information of Joining Times
The joining time is inherently a private information to the contributors. Especially, when the earliest contributor exerts his effort, he is by no means aware of the other's joining time that have not taken place. We hereby formulate a two-stage Stackelberg Bayesian game to characterize the crowdsensing contest where each player knows his exact joining time and the joining time distribution of the other contributors. In Stage-I, the requester announces the incentive mechanism and the joining time distribution so that his utility is optimized and the budget is balanced. In Stage-II, each contributor decides how many efforts to use to maximize his individual payoff. Stage-II: Contributors' Bayesian Game. Except that the players and the strategies are the same as those in G1, we append three different elements for this Bayesian game.
• Types: The type of a contributor is the joining time t i ; Definition 3: (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium) The strategy profile e * is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of G2 if for all i ∈ N and e i = e * i , there has
where e * −i denotes the set of strategies excluding e * i , and E(·) denotes the expectation. Stage-I: Requester's CSF Choice. At Stage-I, the requester can configure the parameter e 0 and the functions b(t i ) for all i so as to maximize his utility, given the budget B. Formally, the equilibrium (e * 0 , b * (·)) is the solution to the following optimization problem:
The requester's efficiency is optimized on the basis of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium at Stage-II.
D. Comparison with Existing Models
Our game framework is closely related to but different from the pioneering studies in [20] and [25] . The major differences are summarized in three aspects:
• Discrimination Rule. There does not exist a discrimination rule in the crowdsensing contest of [20] . In [25] , the marginal cost of a contributor is his private knowledge and the discrimination is based on the marginal cost. We investigate the discrimination on the joining time of the contributors where the origin is the different valuation of the requester on per-unit of effort at different joining times. The analytical framework in [25] does not apply to our problem and hence a new framework is necessary.
• Closed and Open Systems. Only the closed system with a fixed number of contributors is studied in [20] and [25] . Our game framework is applicable to not only this closed system but also the open system with the arrival of contributors governed by a stochastic process. The closed system usually exhibits the busty arrivals of the contributors while the open system has a more stable arrival rate. We are lucky to see that the incentive mechanisms can be orchestrated under the same framework in these two divergent systems.
• Objective Function. The objective of the requester in [20] and [25] is to maximize his total utility on the efforts minus the payment to the contributors. We define a new metric for the requester, namely the crowdsensing efficiency. It is not constrained to the absolute net utility in a particular setting, but is to quantify the utility of the requester brought by per-unit of the budget.
III. TIMELINESS SENSITIVE CROWDSOURCING CONTEST WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION
In this section, we analyze the competition of contributors with timeliness sensitivity, and present important insights in the design of practical incentive mechanisms.
A. Nash Equilibrium
According to the individual rationality property, a contributor will not exert efforts if his participation cannot bring positive payoff. Hence, we need to scrutinize the participation of players on top of a NE. For simplicity of notations, we perform a change of variables by setting E −i = N j=1, =i e j (esp. excluding e 0 ), E = e i + E −i and b(t i ) = b i . We observe that the utility function of each contributor i is strictly concave in e i . Then, the first order condition describes the global maximum of π i (e i , e −i ) with respect to e i ,
where the equality holds upon e i >0. If this equality does not hold, the maximum is obtained at e i = 0, in which contributor i does not "participate" in the crowdsensing. Therefore, the best response of the i th contributor to E −i is
The pure strategy Nash equilibrium must have e * i = e i (e * −i ) for each contributor. We have the following lemma with regard to the participation of contributors.
Lemma 1: (Principles of Participation) In the standard contest function, the participation of a contributor satisfies:
• if e * i > e * j > 0, there must have b i > b j ; • if e 0 ≥ b i , the i th contributor does not participate in the contest; when e 0 increases, the number of participating contributors decreases. Proof: Please refer to Appendix-I.
Based on the best response function in Eq. (10), there has
when only the contributors from 1 to n exert positive effort at the NE. We hereby present a method to search the explicit NE within N steps. The first step is to compute e * by assuming the participation of n = N contributors at the NE. If e * i is positive for all i, the NE is obtained. Otherwise, if any e * i is negative, this means that some of the contributors do not participate at this NE. By removing the concurrent contributors with the smallest b i , we proceed to search until all e * i are positive for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The NE strategy e * i is subsequently computed by
The actual payment to the i th player is
The detailed algorithm to find the unique NE is shown in Algorithm 1. 
We next consider a special discrimination rule that the basic idea is to set the larger maximum rewards to the early contributors and 0 to late ones. Our purpose is to gain the important insights on the design of discrimination rules and on the parameter configuration.
MULTI-CONTRIBUTORS:
When the maximum rewards of the early n contributors are identical, and the remaining late ones are not rewarded, only the former ones participate at the NE. Their efforts at the NE are given by (∀i≤n)
The total reward paid to the contributors is R = bE * e0+E * . Then, the NE efficiency of the requester is
that yields
. The upper and lower bounds are obtained or approximated when e 0 is 0 or is approaching b. Special case 1): the requester is not sensitive to the joining time (i.e. w i = w j = w for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N ). The efficiency E is greater than (n−1)w n and any discrimination (i.e. n < N ) yields a smaller efficiency. Special case 2): the requester is interested in only the earliest two contributions (i.e. w 1 = w 2 = w > 0 and w i = 0 for all i > 2). The discrimination gain can be as high as
with the discrimination rule n = 2.
B. Understanding the function of e 0
Introducing e 0 adds the complexity to the analysis and design of the incentive mechanism. We hereby investigate the role of e 0 and provide a simple guideline of configuring e 0 through the above example.
(1) A positive e 0 may prevent the participation of contributors with low maximum rewards. When b i is below e 0 for a late contributor, he will not participate in the sensing at the NE. Hence, e 0 precludes the participation of late contributors so that the early contributors may exert more efforts.
(2) A positive e 0 has a potential to improve the efficiency of the given discrimination rule. According to Eq.(15), the efficiency is an increasing function of e 0 .
(3) When the number of contributors, n, is large, the efficiency gain brought by e 0 becomes less remarkable.
Given n equal to 2, the efficiency is obtained by
2 with e 0 = 0, and approaches w as e 0 is sufficiently close to b. For n equal to 100, E(100) is 99w 100 with e 0 = 0, and approaches w as e 0 is sufficiently close to b.
(4) Choosing a large e 0 is beneficial to the requester, especially when only a few contributors participate in the competition. However, a large e 0 will reduce the number of participants at the NE. In realistic scenarios, the mobile users join the crowdsensing randomly so that the participation of contributors is very sensitive to the joining times in the presence of a large e 0 . Hence, e 0 is suggested to be a fixed fraction of b simply for the purpose of avoiding the scenarios with only a couple of participants.
The KKT optimization is adopted for the optimal incentive mechanism design. Due to the page limit, we leave the detailed analysis in Appendix-I. Remark 2: The requester can orchestrate the reward discrimination scheme to maximize his crowdsensing efficiency, given the vector of the joining times. However, this is infeasible in reality because the joining time of a player is not known until he undertakes the sensing task. A practical incentive mechanism needs to be announced before the crowdsensing, and needs to be easily implemented.
C. Practical Reward Discrimination Strategies
We hereby turn the reward discrimination into reality, considering that each contributor is unaware of the joining time of other contributors. Three practical strategies are proposed.
Earliest-n Strategy: Let t 1 until t N be the joining times of all the contributors. Let
. The earliest n contributors will have a chance of being rewarded (i.e. b i = b ∀i ≤ n), and all other late contributors will not be rewarded (i.e. b i = 0 ∀i > n).
Termination Time Strategy: The requester sets up a termination time T so that only contributions before T are rewarded. Similarly, we denote by t 1 , · · · , t N the random joining time of all the contributors. If t i ≤ T , there has b(t i ) = b, and b(t i ) = 0 otherwise.
Linearly Decreasing Strategy: The maximum reward function is set to b(t i ) = max{0, b − ht i } for every player i. The velocity h can be tuned to further optimize the efficiency of the requester.
In the earliest-n strategy, a contributor is unaware of his ranking in terms of the joining time; in the termination time strategy, he is unaware of the number of opponents joining before the deadline; in the linearly decreasing strategy, he is unaware of the maximum achievable rewards of his opponents. These uncertainties lead to competitions with incomplete information. Remark 3: The linearly decreasing strategy is yet a different implementation of the earliest-n strategy, which will be shown later on.
IV. STACKELBERG BAYESIAN GAME WITH TIMELINESS SENSITIVITY In this section, we analyze the Stackelberg Bayesian Nash equilibrium (SBNE) of crowdsensing contests. Optimal strategies are proposed for the requester to maximize his efficiency.
A. Earliest-n Strategy
In our context, all the contributors are not notified whether they are ranked as the earliest n contributors. Hence, as the first step, we must compute the probability of being one of the earliest-n contributors if the i th contributor joins at time t i . Suppose that t i is the j th smallest joining time. Among all the contributors, there are j − 1 contributors earlier than him and N − j contributors later than him. Considering all the possible rankings of t i no larger than the n th place, the probability of being the earliest-n contributor is given by
where p is the probability of a contributor joining before t i . Note that in the earliest-n strategy, the number of participated contributors can be at most N , though only the first n of them are rewarded. Here, with certain abuse of notation, we can use a function b(t i ) to denote bP i∈{n} , and b(t i ) is continuous, differentiable and strictly decreasing w.r.t. t i . Then, the utility of contributor i with joining time t i is simplified as
For contribution i, the joining time t i is his private information, while only the statistical joining time distribution of other contributions is known as a priori. In this situation, we model the crowdsourcing competition as a Bayesian game where the join time of a contributor is characterised as his type. We will apply the backward induction principle to solve the proposed Bayesian game, i.e., first analyzing Stage-II and then determining the optimal policy at Stage-I accordingly. Stage-II: Finding Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. For any contributor other than i, i.e. j ∈ N and j = i, since each t j is drawn from the common distribution F (t), the expected utility of contributor i on all the combinations is given by
As the first step, we analyze the existence and uniqueness of this Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1: (Existence and Uniqueness of Earliest-n BNE) The Earliest-n incentive strategy has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) in the contest. Proof: Please refer to Appendix-I.
We now turn to establish basic properties of pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. As stated before, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy e * satisfies
Similar to the NE condition of the complete information game, for each contributor i of the earliest-n scheme, the equilibrium condition is given by
with equality in the situation e * i ≥ 0. Otherwise, the i th contributor does not participate. In general, there does not admit a close-form solution to this system of (in)equations. However, we can still infer interesting properties of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2: (Participation and Bound under Earliest-n Strategy) In the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Earliest-n scheme, contributor i's strategy has the following property (with a meaningful condition b > e 0 ).
• If n = N , e * i is positive with b > e 0 for all i.
• If 1 ≤ n < N , there exists at such that e * i is 0 for t >t while e * i is positive and strictly decreasing for t <t. Especially,t is no larger than b −1 (e 0 ).
• The upper bound of e * i (t i ) is Stage-I: Optimizing Requester's Efficiency. In the earliest-n scheme, the requester announces his reward allocation function before the contest takes place. As mentioned before, once e 0 is chosen to be a fraction of the maximum reward b, the efficiency is independent of b. The requester only needs to configure an optimal n to optimize his efficiency.
At the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the amount of efforts exerted by contributor i is e * i (t i ). This contributor generates a utility of w(t i )e * i (t i ) to the requester. Since t i is unknown to the requester, his expected utility on contributor i's effort is obtained by
Because the joining time is i.i.d. at all the contributors (the assumption of identical distribution is not obligatory), the expected total utility of the requester is
For each set of joining time t, the reward paid to all the contributors is
at the BNE. Then, the expected reward paid by the requester takes the following integral form
The requester needs to configure an appropriate b such that the expected reward apportioned to the contributors is equal to the budget B.
For each vector of joining time t, the efficiency of the requester is given by
Then, the expected efficiency is
The optimal n * can be searched for no more than N times in the above formula. The main complexity stems from the multi-dimensional integral in computing the BNE at stage-II. This multi-dimensional integral can be substituted by the Monte Carlo sum via discretizing the integral zone into a large number of multi-dimensional cubes.
B. Termination Time Strategy
In the termination time strategy, the requester only allocates rewards to the contributors who join the contest before time T . Obviously, a contributor later than time T will not participate in the contest. Given the distribution of joining times, a contributor arrives before time T is computed as p = F (T ). In this game, the number of participating contributors is uncertain. Denote by n 1 the number of participating contributors in a pool of n 2 contributors in total. The probability that n 1 out of n 2 contributors join before the expiration time T is given by
due to their i.i.d. joining times. We analyze this Bayesian game using the backward induction as follows. Stage-II: Finding Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. We analyze the expected utility of the i th contributor here. If he participates, there will be at most N − 1 other contributors. To compute the expected utility, we exhaust all the possibilities in terms of the number of contributors in the contest. For a fixed maximum reward b, his expected utility is obtained by
When k is zero, the i th contributor only competes with the Nature player. In this Bayesian game, each contributor aims to maximize his expected utility. To begin with, we show the existence of a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3: (Existence and Uniqueness of BNE for Termination Time Strategy) The crowdsensing contest using termination time strategy admits a unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Proof: Please refer to Appendix-I.
The BNE is symmetric in which all the contributors joining before time T exert the same amount of effort. According to the optimality conditions at the BNE, the following equations hold
The above equation intuitively shows that an increase of b induces more effort from the contributors. For the special case e 0 = 0, e * i admits a close form solution, that is,
Stage-I: Optimizing Requester's Efficiency. From the requester's perspective, contributor i with the joining time t i (t i ≤ T ) generates a utility w(t i )e * i to him. For the special case that no contributor arrives before T , the utility of the requester is 0 for sure, and his efficiency is set to 0 as a penalty of unsuccessful crowdsensing. Therefore, the expected total utility of the requester is obtained by
The number of contributors whose joining times before time T ranges from 0 to N . The corresponding probability of having k participants before T is P(k, N ). A fraction of the total reward allocated by the requester can be solved as
Here, b is chosen to let E[R] be equal to the budget B.
One should be informed that the summation begins from the subscript k = 1, which is unlike (28) . This is because Eq.(31) counts the allocated reward when there is at least one contributors. We next compute the efficiency of the requester. Denote byt i the joining time of contributor i before termination 8 time T . For each valid contributor, his joining time follows a conditional distribution of that of the original joining time,
The pdf oft i is subsequently obtained by
We then compute the efficiency of the requester for each vector of joining times
when k out of N contributors are before T and E = 0 for k = 0. The expectation of E incorporates two kinds of uncertainties; one is the number of valid contributors, and the other is the exact joining times of the valid contributors. With the detailed derivation in the Appendix-I, we have
The optimal termination time T is chosen to maximize the efficiency of the requester, that is,
where p and e * i are functions of T . The optimal T * can be approximated by enumerating a finite number of candidate termination times or by a bisection search.
C. Linearly Decreasing Strategy
The requester sets b(t) as a linearly decreasing function b(t i ) = max{0, b − ht i } where the velocity h is tunable to maximize his efficiency. For the fixed h, the Stackelberg Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be solved using the same approach as that of the earliest-n strategy. In other words, b(t i ) is bP i∈{n} in the earliest-n strategy and is max{0, b − ht i } in the linearly decreasing strategy. Another exception is that the earliest-n strategy needs to try different n, while the linearly decreasing strategy needs to search the different velocity h. One can choose a finite set of candidate h beforehand and try them one by one.
D. Comparisons
Both the earliest-n and termination time strategies are practical simplifications to the original complicated reward allocation function. They constitute the contest with incomplete information model by using Bayesian game theory. Though their basic ideas are to incentivize the early joining contributors to exert more effort, they differ in several aspects.
• The type of the earliest-n strategy is the joining time, while the type is the number of contributors joining before time T in the termination time strategy (implicitly determined by their joining time).
• A contributor arriving after a certain time may not exert efforts in the earliest-n strategy, while in the termination time strategy, all the contributors joining before T exert the same amount of positive effort, and those arriving after T will not spend any effort.
• The earliest-n and the linearly decreasing strategies incur more complicated integral computations than the termination time strategy. Remark 5: In the Bayesian game, each contributor is aware of the joining time distribution of all the others. When the joining time distributions of contributors are heterogeneous, announcing all these distributions may divulge the privacy of contributors, even though such information is anonymous. A feasible solution is to treat all of them homogeneous and to release the anonymous joining time distribution.
V. OPEN CROWDSENSING SYSTEM
In this section, we generalize our game framework to incorporate the open crowdsensing system with external arriving contributors.
A. Modelling an Open Crowdsensing System
Our previous models consider a fixed number of potential contributors, where the joining time of each contributor is characterized by a certain distribution. This is actually a closed crowdsensing system. In some applications, the requester is open to the arriving contributors without keeping the information of their personal joining time. Each arriving contributor decides the amount of efforts for crowdsensing, knowing the incentive mechanism and his joining time. Here, we suppose that the potential contributors join the contest at a Poisson rate denoted by λ. The public information is thus this arrival rate, other than the joining time distributions of all the contributors. th contributor and the m th one. Note that the process starts at time 0 and that multiple arrivals cannot occur simultaneously (owing to the infinite divisibility of time). The arrival process can also be specified by two other stochastic processes. The first alternative is the sequence of inter-arrival times, X 1 , X 2 , · · · . These are positive random variables defined in terms of the arrival epochs by X 1 = S 1 and X j = S j − S j−1 for j > 1. Hence, given the X j , the arrival epochs S j are specified as
The joint distribution of X (m) = {X 1 , · · · , X m } for all m > 1 is sufficient to specify the arrival process where X j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) is exponentially distributed. The second alternative for specifying an arrival process is the counting process N (t), where for each t > 0, the random variable N (t) is the number of arrivals up to and including time t. The counting process is an uncountably infinite family of random variables {N (t); t > 0}. When examining a sequence of arrivals, we usually consider a truncated counting process with a fixed number of arrivals. We denote S (m) = {S 1 , · · · , S m } be the sequence of joining epochs, and denote s (m) = {s 1 , · · · , s m } be the vector of joining times of this sequence.
The joint distribution of joining epochs is a known result in queueing theory [30] . By convolving a number of exponential distributions, the joint probability density function (p.d.f.) of the sequence S (m) is given by
Let f S (m) |N (t) (s (m) |(m, t)) be the joint density of {S 1 , · · · , S m } conditioned on N (t) = m and time t. Then, this density is constant over the region 0 < s 1 < · · · < s m < t and has the expression
Here, Eq. (37) is the joint density of S (m) where S M can be arbitrary in this sequence. Eq. (38) is usually the joint density of S (m) in a fixed duration from 0 to t. An interesting observation is that the joint p.d.f. is not explicitly related to s 1 until s m−1 , but is implicitly coupled in the conditions 0<s 1 < · · · <s m < t. The conditional joint density is uniformly distributed. For this Poisson process, the probability moment function for N (t) (i.e. the number of arrivals in (0, t]) is given by
In what follows, we will investigate whether our analytical framework for the closed crowdsensing system can be generalized to an open system with external arrivals.
B. Earliest-n Strategy of Open Crowdsensing System 1) Stage-II: If a contributor joins the contest at time s i , the probability of having no more than n−1 arrivals is given by
Then, the maximum reward that the i th joining contributor can acquire is bP i∈{n} on average.
Consider a truncated counting system with a maximum number of M contributors where M is reasonably large. The basis of this simplification is that the joining of the potential contributors after contributor M is usually too late from the requester's angle. The payoff of the contributor arriving at t i is the same as that of Eq. (17) except for substituting P i∈{n} in Eq. (16) When the i th contributor joins, he has no knowledge on the joining times of all the others. After isolating the i th arrival epoch from the arrival sequence, we assume the remaining sequence as the original Poisson counting system. This assumption slightly deviates from the original arrival sequence, while greatly reducing the complexity of modelling the expected utility of the i th contributor. Then, for the remaining (M − 1) contributors, the p.d.f. of j th contributor is computed by Eq. (37). The expected utility of contributor i on all the combinations of S (M ) is given by
where there are M −1 integrals and i is not regarded as an item in the range [1, M −1]. The procedure of finding the Bayesian Nash equilibrium follows that of the closed crowdsensing system.
2) Stage-I: At the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the i th joining contributor exerts e * i efforts that yield the utility w(s i )e * i (s i ) to the requester. Because each contributor makes decision independently, the requester sees a collection of M contributions each of which depends on its own joining time. For M contributors with the sequence of arrival epochs {S 1 , · · · , S M }, the expected utility of the requester at the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is
and the expected reward paid to contributors is
For a vector of joining times S (M ) , the efficiency of the requester is computed as
Compared with the closed crowdsensing system, the analytical framework of the open system remains the same. In fact, the open system is very similar to the closed system except that the joining time of an independent contributor is substituted by the joint distribution of all the incoming contributors.
C. Termination Time Strategy of Open Crowdsensing System 1) Stage-II:
In an open crowdsensing system, the total number of contributors joining before the deadline T can be arbitrarily large. To avoid the analytical complexity, we suppose that there are at most M contributors. For each contributor arriving at S i ≤ T , he can estimate the probability of meeting other k contributors with the joining times before T . In this situation, there are (k+1) contributors in total conditioned on the existence of at least one contributor joining before T . Then, there has
We then substitute P(k, N − 1) in Eq. (28) by P(k, ∞) in Eq. (46). The Bayesian Nash equilibrium e * i is solved in the same way as the closed system. Given the arrival sequence {S 1 , · · · , S M }, all the contributors with S i ≤ T will exert the same amount of efforts, and those with S i > T will not participate. In addition, e * i is unrelated to the exact values of arrival epochs S 1 , · · · , S M . Therefore, we denote e * i = e * if S i ≤ T and e * i = 0 otherwise. 2) Stage-I: Given the arrival sequence S (M ) = {S 1 , · · · , S M }, the utility of the requester is:
When the requester designs the incentive mechanism, he will estimate the number of arrivals before T using Eq. (39). Note that Eq. (39) computes the probability of having m arrivals before T while Eq. (46) computes the probability of "seeing" other k arrivals before T by a tagged contributor. Suppose that m out of M contributors join the crowdsensing before T . The joint distribution of S (m) conditioned on N (T ) = m is obtained by Eq. (38). The conditional expected utility of the requester is
Considering all the possible scenarios regarding the number of arrivals before T , we obtain the expected utility of the requester
The expected reward allocated to the contributors can be calculated as
where the budget is B.
When m contributors join before T , the efficiency of the requester is given by
The conditional expected efficiency is thus
At the first sight, one can observe that the requester's conditional expected efficiency involves a complicated Ndimensional integral. However, the special structure of the integral allows us to derive a much more succinct result. Lemma 2: The conditional expected efficiency of the requester for the termination time strategy can be calculated as
Proof: Please refer to Appendix-I. Eq. (53) gives rise to the expected utility of the requester by traversing all possible m
The optimal termination time T * maximizes Eq.(54) where a binary search approach can be used to find T * . Remark 6: When the arrival of the contributors deviates far away from Poisson process, our analytical approach also applies, while the simple expression of the efficiency at the termination time strategy is not obtainable.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct numerical simulations to validate the effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanisms. Both the closed and the open systems are considered.
A. Simulation Setup
We collect the WiFi access record of college students and faculties at Guanghua Building of Fudan University. This dataset spans one month, containing the anonymous user ID, the location of APs, the time stamp of accessing APs. For the closed system, we randomly select 20 users from the top one hundred active users. Note that the active users will possess enough samples to generate the meaningful distribution functions of the joining time. Figure 2 and 3 display the cumulative distribution function and the probability distribution function of joining time where the starting point is 10:00 am and the ending point is 4:00 pm. For the open system, we set an arrival rate without using the collected data because the arrival rate is too large in this tall building (e.g. more than one person per minute on average).
The timeliness property is reflected by two examples in the closed system: a step function w(t) = {1, 0.6, 0.2, 0} with discontinuous points at t = {10 : 00, 11 : 30, 13 : 00, 16 : 00}, and an inverse quadratic function w(t) = (1 + 1 6 (t − 10)) −2 for t ∈ [10, 16] (i.e. in the range between 10:00 and 16:00). To try more choices, we let the step function be w(t) = {1, 0.6, 0.2, 0} where w(t) changes abruptly at the normalized time {0, 0.5, 1, 1.5}, and let the inverse cubic weight function be w(t) = (1 + t/3) −3 . The total reward for allocation is B = 1 if not mentioned explicitly. We consider three different sets of {e 0 , b} that have e0 b = {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}.
B. Closed System
Earliest-n Strategy. We compute the BNE numerically following the approach in [28] . The basic idea is to decompose the continuous space into a number of multi-dimensional cubes. Then, the integral is substituted by the sum of its value on all the cubes. To reduce the complexity of traversing all of them, we adopt the more efficient Monte Carlo integration approach. When the number of contributors is large, the computational burden is relieved for we do not need to traverse the less important cubes. Figure 4 illustrates the efficiency of the requester with the step weight function as n increases from 2 to 20. One can see that by limiting the number of rewarded contributors, the requester can even double his efficiency. It is wise to choose n to be between 8 and 12. Meanwhile, a larger e0 b usually brings a higher efficiency. One exception happens at n = 2 because the mobile users might not aways participate in the competition thus yielding a zero efficiency occasionally. When e 0 is set to 0.8b other than 0.5b and 0.2b, the maximum efficiency of the requester is improved by around 0.06 and 0.09 respectively. This implies that introducing a "nature" player can effectively enhance the requester's efficiency.
In Figure 5 , we illustrate the efficiency with the inverse weight function. As n increases from 2 to 20, the requester's efficiency increases in the beginning and decreases in the end. The optimal n can be chosen to be six to eight.
In Figure 7 , we show the efforts exerted by a contributor at the BNE when he joins the crowdsensing at different times. Each curve indicates a different earliest-n strategy. When the joining time t increases, he contributes less and less efforts, and upon a certain threshold he does not participate. An early comer exerts more efforts than a late one. For different earliestn strategies, the participation threshold for a larger n is also longer. In the proposed incentive mechanisms, n and b are configured simultaneously so that the allocated reward equals to the budget. Figure 7 shows the contour lines of the pairs (n, b) with different budget Bs. Any point in a contour line refers to a combination of n and b yielding the allocated reward equal to the budget. We observe that b is a strictly decreasing function of n. When rewarding more contributors, the maximum achievable reward for each of them will be smaller. Note that the efforts and the contour lines are solely determined by the competition at stage-I, irrelevant to the shapes of the weight function of the requester. Termination Time Strategy. Figure 8 plots the efficiency of the requester with the step weight function for the termination time strategy. The efficiency is evaluated by postponing this deadline for fifteen minutes every time. As the termination time increases, the efficiency increases first and then decreases where the highest value is achieved around 11:15 am. Figure  9 illustrates the efficiency of the requester when the weight function is linearly decreasing. The optimal termination times are nearly 11:00, 11:30 and 12:00 for e 0 to be 0.2b, 0.5b, 0.8b respectively. Both sets of experiments demonstrate that the appropriate selection of the termination time can greatly improve the efficiency of the requester. In addition, a similar observation holds when e0 b chooses different values. Compared with the case e 0 = 0.2b, the requester's efficiency improves by nearly 0.04 at e 0 = 0.5b and by 0.1 at e 0 = 0.8b. Figure 10 plots the amount of efforts exerted by a contributor under different termination times. The amount of efforts decreases with the increase of the termination time, and the rate of decline is especially large 10:00 and 11:00. The reasons of this "cliff effect" are twofold: i) multiple contributors may flush into the competition; ii) the amount of efforts at the BNE is more sensitive to the change of the number of contributors when it is relatively small. As the designer of the termination time strategy, the requester needs to configure b and T jointly so that the expected expenditure equals to the budget. Figure  11 shows the contour lines of (b, T ) under different budgets. When the termination time T increases, more contributors will participate in the competition at the BNE. Therefore, the maximum achievable reward b should be lower so as to balance the expenditure and the budget.
C. Open System
Earliest-n Strategy. Figure 12 shows that the efficiency of a contributor increases first and then decreases with the increase of the number of rewarded contributors. In this set of experiments, the nature player has a significant impact on the requester's efficiency. When the earliest eight contributors are rewarded, the efficiencies at e 0 = 0.2b, 0.5b and 0.8b are around 0.73, 0.82 and 0.92 respectively. Given the arrival rate λ = 0.15, the inter-arrival time is exponentially distributed with the mean of four hundred seconds. Thus, some potential contributors may arrive very late. Introducing the nature player may exclude the participation of late comers so that the requester's efficiency is improved. Figure 13 illustrates the efficiency of the requester with the inverse function, which the similar patterns are demonstrated. Figure 14 illustrates the amount of efforts exerted by a contributor where the x-coordinate indicates the joining time. When the joining time becomes larger, the contributor is inclined to allocating less efforts at the BNE. Figure 15 plots the contour lines for the pair (n, b) with different budgets. The larger budget B means the larger b for the fixed n, and the larger n for the fixed b. Given the fixed B, the increases of n (resp. b) results in the decrease of b (resp. n). Termination Time Strategy. Figure 16 and 17 show the efficiency of the requester with the step and the inverse weight functions. Considering the case of e 0 = 0.8b, the peak of the efficiency appears at 0.5 hour for the step weight function and appears at 0.3 hour for the inverse weight function. We have two observations regarding the efficiency of the requester. One is that the efficiency of termination time strategy is better than that of the earliest-n strategy. The other is that the nature player is less influential in determining the efficiency of the requester. Compared with Efficiency of earliest-n scheme: closed system with inverse weight function the case e 0 = 0.2b, the efficiency is improved by around 0.05 at the peaks for the case e 0 = 0.5b, and by around 0.1 at the peaks for the case e 0 = 0.8b. The main reason for both phenomena is that the earliest-n strategy overly drives out the late joining contributors. Figure 18 illustrates the amount of efforts exerted by a contributor at different joining times. One can observe a similar "cliff effect" as that in the closed system. Figure  19 shows the contour lines of the pair (b, T ) where the expected expenditure equals to the budgets. For a fixed budget, choosing a larger termination time means a smaller maximum achievable budget, and vice versa. When T (resp. b) is fixed, a larger budget B requires the configuration of a larger b (resp. T ).
VII. RELATED WORK
There is a growing literature on the optimal design of incentive mechanism in crowdsourcing and mobile crowdsensing applications. For instance, [5] , [6] targeted at incentivizing high quality user generated content in online question and answer forums. [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] provided entertainmentlike or monetary incentives for workers to label tasks in MTurk. The proliferation of mobile handheld devices triggers a variety of crowdsensing technologies. Pioneering sensing systems consist of NoiseTube [19] for noise monitoring, SignalGuru [14] for traffic monitoring, and some others [10] . We categorize the literature on incentive mechanism design into two groups according to their methodologies: one is the auction based approach and the other is the game theoretic approach.
Auction based approach. DiPalantino and Vojnovic connected crowdsourcing to an all-pay auction model in which users selected among, and subsequently compete in, multiple contests offering various rewards [4] . Singla and Krause [8] presented a near optimal, posted-price mechanism for online budgeted procurement in crowdsourcing platforms. Authors in [9] modeled the interaction between workers and the crowdsourcer as a reverse auction for task labelling under strict budget constraint. Yang et al. designed an auction-based incentive mechanism for mobile phones to collect and analyze data [20] . Jin et al. designed incentive mechanisms based on reverse combinatorial auctions that approximately maximized the social welfare with a guaranteed approximation ratio [22] .
Luo et al. studied an incentive mechanism based on allpay auction with more realistic factors such as information asymmetry, population uncertainty and risk aversion [23] .
Game theoretic approach. Authors in [5] studied the question of designing incentives for online Q&A forums. Ghosh and McAfee modeled the economics of incentivizing highquality user generated content using noncooperative game, and investigated the highest quality at the NE under an elimination mechanism [6] . Yang et al. [20] studied a platform-centric incentive mechanism for maximizing the total effort from contributors in mobile crowdsensing that utilizes a Stackelberg game framework. Authors in [25] presented an optimal Tullock contest model for crowdsensing with incomplete information.
The studies most relevant to ours are [20] , [25] that utilized Tullock-like contest models. In the pioneering work [20] , the crowdsensing was modeled by a complete information Tullock game. [25] investigated the same contest model with incomplete information that admited a BNE, and presented an optimal prize function to maximize the total efforts. Both studies do not consider the timeliness of contributions. We rigorously show how an appropriate form of contest model can be chosen, and propose two novel Stackelberg Bayesian contest mechanisms to incentivize early joining contestants to contribute more efforts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the incentive mechanism deign for timeliness sensitive crowdsensing using the Tullock contest framework. Each contributor is featured by his joining time, and the requester has a higher valuation toward an early contribution than a late one with the same effort. The core issue faced by the requester is how to offer different preferences to the contributors regarding their joining times, given the fixed budget. Two representative reward discrimination schemes, the earliest-n and the termination time schemes, are proposed. We develop a Stackelberg Bayesian game framework to capture the competition of the contributors without the complete information, and to characterize the orchestration of the competition by the requester to maximize his crowdsensing efficiency. We prove the existence and uniqueness of BNE, and present the optimal parameter configuration for each scheme. Our game framework is powerful in its applicability to both the closed crowdsensing system with a fixed number of players and the open system whose arrival of contributors follows a stochastic process. Numerical simulations validate the effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanisms.
APPENDIX-I: PROOFS AND DERIVATIONS A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: i) It is easy to prove by contradiction. Suppose 0 < e * i < e * j if b i ≥ b j . According to the expression in (9), the left hand for i is greater than that for j. The right hand for i is the same as that for j, which equality does not hold. Thus, if e * i > e * j > 0, there must have b i > b j . ii) When e 0 is greater than b i , the left hand of the expression in (9) is always less than the right hand. Hence, e * i is 0 all the time. For the same reason, the number of participating contributors decreases if e 0 increases.
B. Optimal Reward Discrimination
With the complete information on t i for all i, the requester is able to steer the configuration of b(t i ) (i.e. b i for brevity) to maximize his efficiency (equivalent to utility maximization when there is no uncertainty):
The optimal design falls in the scope of nonlinear programming. The individual rationality rule makes the optimization problem not differentiable anywhere. Solving the optimal reward vector b * involves complicated operations on some implicit functions. For clarity, we hereby examine the optimal incentive mechanism in the case e 0 = 0. When e 0 is nonzero, all the procedures remain the same, and are omitted henceforth.
The optimization problem with e 0 = 0 is simplified as
where n * is the number of players with nonzero efforts at the NE. Since n * is an inter coupled with the NE, this optimization problem is inherently non-differentiable on b i . To bypass this difficulty, we treat each n * as a constant in the range [1, N ], and compute the optimal reward discrimination vector {b *
is feed into the original game model so as to check the individual rationality condition. If individual rationality is satisfied, this vector maximizes the requester's utility owing to the uniqueness of the NE.
We use the Lagrangian method to solve the constrained optimization problem. Define L(b, λ) as
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. The optimal b * maximizes L(b, λ) while satisfying the equality constraint in Eq.(56). The standard approach of searching b * is to compute the derivatives of L(b, λ) on each b i and let 
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: We apply results in [28] to prove the existence of a BNE, and results in [29] to prove the uniqueness. For consistency with [28] and [29] , it is useful to perform the change of variables c i := − 
where
, the probability distribution of c i is obtained by
We take the partial derivative of E[π i (e, c i )] over e i and c i so to have
According to [28] , the single crossing condition for an incomplete information game is satisfied. In addition, E[π i (e, c i )] is continuous as long as e 0 > 0, which satisfies the requirements of uniqueness. Hence, there exists a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
The uniqueness of pure strategy BNE can be directly proved because E[π i (e, c i )] satisfies the conditions from U1 to U3, and from D1 to D2 mention in [28] .
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: i) It is direct to see that all the contributors may participate in the contest for the special case n = N . The lefthand side (LHS) of Eq. (20) is no larger than 1 if b ≤ e 0 , and is greater than 1 otherwise. Hence, either all the contributors do not exert effort, or exert the same amount of effort at the NE.
ii) If n is less than N , b(t) is infinitely close to 0 as t approaches infinity. Then, b(t) is in the range (0, b] .
The left-hand side of Eq. (20) is strictly decreasing in e * i . Hence, if e * i (t) is greater than 0 for some joining timet, then e * i (t) ≥ e * i (t) for all t <t because b(t) is a strictly decreasing function of t. Therefore, a constantt must exist such that e * i (t) = 0 for t ≥t while e * i (t) is positive and strictly decreasing for t >t. Note that the LHS of Eq. (20) is maximized when E * −i is 0. This implies b(t) ≥ e 0 , or equivalently t ≤ b −1 (e 0 ). iii) Assuming t i <t. We multiply both sides of Eq. (20) with e * i (t) and obtain
Denote a random variable Ω with
Thus, we obtain
The equality holds at e * i (t i ) = e 0 + E * −i which implies e 0 ≤ 
Thus, the maximum Ω is obtained on the curve with E * −i = 0. Under this situation, Ω is simplified as
Hence, the following inequality holds
According to Eq.(59), there has
This concludes the proof.
E. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: To prove the existence and uniqueness of BNE, we need to show the unique fixed point solution to the set of best response functions. By taking the derivative of E[π i ] over e i , we obtain
The equality holds for the circumstance e i ≥ 0. Since the requester does not discriminate the contributors who join before T , all of them exerts the same amount of effort according to the above optimality condition.
Next, we will show the uniqueness of this symmetric equilibrium. In Eq.(60), when the equality holds, the righthand is a strictly decreasing function of e i . Then, e i is unique to enable dE[πi] dei = 0 for all i with t i ≤ T . Thus, there exists a unique BNE in the crowdsourcing contest with termination time strategy. (35) Equation (35) is obtained by the following steps:
F. Derivation of Equation
E[E] = N k=1 P(k, N ) E[ k l=1 w(t l )]e * i (e 0 + ke * i ) bke * i = N k=1 P(k, N ) k l=1 E[w(t l )](e 0 + ke * i ) bk = 1 bp N k=1 P(k, N )(e 0 +ke * i ) T 0 w(t)f (t)dt = e 0 bp N k=1 P(k, N ) + e * i bp N k=1 kP(k, N ) T 0 w(t)f (t)dt = e 0 bp (1 − (1 − p) N ) + N e * i b T 0 w(t)f (t)dt.(61)
G. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: We prove this lemma by mathematical induction. First of all, we claim that the integral part of Eq. (52) is 
ii) We assume that Eq. (53) holds for m > 2.
iii) For m + 1, the integral part of Eq. (52) is
Therefore, our claim is proved by mathematical induction. Submitting Eq. (62) to Eq. (52), we obtain
which concludes the proof.
.
APPENDIX-II: JUSTIFICATION OF CONTEST SUCCESS FUNCTION
Define E as the requester's efficiency that is the utility brought by per-unit payment, conditioned on the fixed budget B allocated to the contributors, i.e. E = U B R=B . The requester is able to optimize E| R=B by properly discriminating the contributors with different joining times. An auxiliary metric is named as "discrimination gain" denoted by G = E d /E nd where E nd and E d are the requester's efficiencies without and with discrimination.
A. Generalized Tullock Contest Success Function
be the set of non-negative coefficients that are related to
. For notational simplicity, we do not display {t i } N i=1 unless necessary. We define e −i = {e j } 
where v i is in the range (0, 1] for all i. According to contest theory [27] , this reward sharing rule coincides all the five axioms for contest success functions (CSFs). The physical interpretation is that a contributor acquires a larger reward if he contributes a higher effort, and a smaller reward if any of his opponent spends more effort. The rate of increased reward is shrinking as this contributor exerts more and more effort. The constant e 0 is introduced by the requester that if it is positive, the reward will not be completely assigned to the contributors.
A larger e 0 means that the requester retains a higher percentage of reward. Actually, a non-zero e 0 is equivalent to introducing a NATURE player, where e 0 influences the crowdsensing effort of all the players. Throughout this work, if not mentioned explicitly, we suppose e 0 to be 0, i.e. the whole reward will be shared among the contributors. The vectors of coefficients, a, b and v, are introduced to offer discriminations to different contributors. They are placed at different "positions" in the contest success function so to modify crowdsensing contest in different ways.
Given identical v and b, for the same effort e i = e j , contributor i obtains a higher reward than contributor j, i.e. r i > r j if a i > a j .
Given identical a, b and e i = e j , we endow the early contribution a higher exponent, that is,
The maximum possible rewards obtained by different contributors can be distinct. Given identical a, v and e i = e j , there exists r i > r j if b i > b j . The weight discrimination changes the priority and the exponent discrimination changes the elasticity of effort in bringing reward. Denote by R the total reward paid to the contributors that has R = N i=1 r i ([e, t]). In the incentive mechanism design, the requester needs to make R equal to B. Once b are homogeneous and e 0 is zero, these two discrimination schemes do not alter the total reward paid by the requester. However, the reward discrimination scheme provides different penalties to the maximum achievable reward, henceforth changing the aggregate reward paid by the requester. Our main purpose is to investigate whether these discriminate schemes can incentive more timely effort from the contributors. To this goal, when we manipulate one vector of coefficients, the other two vectors of coefficients are supposed to be identical, thus effectively simplifying our analysis.
In what follows, we analyze the NE properties of Game G1. We reveal a couple of paradoxes in the discrimination schemes and provide important insights on incentive mechanism design.
Challenges: A deep understanding of this incentive mechanism is usually intractable for two reasons: firstly, the Nash equilibrium of a Tullock contest does not admit a close-form solution in general; secondly, all the parameters are coupled in a complicated way such that there does not yield any insight without proper separation of them.
To overcome these difficulties, we simplify our analysis in two aspects. One is to begin with the scenario of two contributors, and then to generalize our observations to an arbitrary population. The other is to assume that only one set of parameters in {a, b, v} are heterogeneous among the contributors when each of the discrimination rules is studied. With above simplifications, we can gain important insights on what form an appropriate incentive mechanism should take on. Our analysis starts from a simple scenario with N = 2 if not mentioned explicitly.
B. Nash Equilibrium with Weight Discrimination
WEIGHT DISCRIMINATION:
v, e 0 = 0, w 1 ≥ w 2 , a 1 = a and a 2 = 1.
For the special case N = 2, we can solve the unique NE in explicit form. We suppose that the first contributor joins the contest earlier than the second. The extent of preference to the first contributor is reflected by the coefficient a. By letting the derivatives dπ1 de1 and dπ2 de2 be 0, we obtain two equations that yield the following solution
The derivatives satisfy de * i da < 0 for a > 1 and
da > 0 for a < 1, which implies that the maximum e * i is obtained at a = 1. The efficiency of the requester is given by E = abv(w1+w2) (1+a) 2 whose maximum value is reached at a = 1. This yields the following paradox. Paradox 1: The weight discrimination scheme adopted by the requester will diminish his efficiency on the contrary.
C. Nash Equilibrium with Exponent Discrimination
EXPONENT DISCRIMINATION:
Following the same approach, it is easy to yield e * 1 : e * 2 = v 1 : v 2 . The unique NE of G1 is a feasible solution to the following equation
Let us take a look at a special case with b = 1. Any reasonable strategy of a contributor that leads to a positive payoff should satisfy e 1 ≤ 1 and e 2 ≤ 1. Suppose that the both contributors exert the same mount of effort. Due to v 1 ≥ v 2 , there has e v1 1 ≤ e v1 2 . The late contributor obtains a higher share of the reward, and hence a larger payoff. On the contrary, if the exponents satisfy v 1 < v 2 , the early contributor acquires a smaller share of reward with e 1 = e 2 ≥ 1, and then a lower payoff. This is in conflict with the original discrimination purpose to offer more benefits to the early contributor.
The exponent discrimination scheme may degrade the requester's efficiency. Formally, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 3: In the exponent discrimination with v i >v j , the NE of game G1 satisfies: (1) e * i > e * j ; (2) if all the parameters are fixed except v j , increasing v j also improves the effort of both contributors. Paradox 2: If the requester favors the earlier contributor by configuring a larger exponent, the payoff of the early one could be worse than that of the late one. A large difference between two exponents (i.e. sufficient discrimination) leads to the reduction of effort in the both contributors.
D. Nash Equilibrium with Reward Discrimination
Similarly, we suppose that the first contributor joins the contest earlier than the second one, i.e. w 1 ≥ w 2 . It is reasonable to set b 1 ≥ b 2 in the reward discrimination. We denote two new variables, β := b1 b2 ≥ 1 and u := w1 w2 ≥ 1. By differentiating π i over e i , and letting the derivatives be 0, we obtain e * 1 = βe * 2 at the unique NE. This NE is subsequently solved by
Observation 1: If the requester prefers the early contribution by setting a larger maximum achievable reward, the early contributor exerts more effort than the late one at the NE. Analysis on Requester's Efficiency. The total reward paid by the requester is
The above expression yields the efficiency of requester as
We next investigate the impacts of u, v and β on the efficiency.
Lemma 4: The interplays between the efficiency of requester, E d , and the parameters u, v and β are summarized as follows:
• E is a decreasing function of u.
• There exists a constantβ 1 such that E is an increasing function of β if β ≤β 1 , and a decreasing function of β if β >β 1 . As β approaches infinity, the requester's efficiency becomes 0.
• There exists a constantβ 2 such that E is a strictly increasing function of v if β ≤β 2 . Otherwise, as v increases from 0 to 1, E increases until reaching its maximum at the extreme pointv, and decreases afterwards. For the second property, if the early contributor is offered enough preference (i.e. large β), the efficiency of requester is low. As an example of the third property, when β is less than 3.9026, max v E is obtained at v = 1. This implies that a reasonable tradeoff is to let v be 1 and β be relatively small. We plot the relationship between E and u as well as w for v = 0.4 and v = 1.0 in Fig.20 . The efficiency of the requester is intuitively higher in the case v = 1. Observation 2: To acquire a high efficiency of the requester, he needs to choose a large exponent v and a relatively small reward ratio β in the contest function.
Analysis on Discrimination Gain. When there is no reward discrimination, β equals to 1 so to have E = vw(u+1) 4bu
. Comparing E d (with discrimination) with E nd (with no discrimination), we obtain
which clearly shows that the discrimination gain is jointly determined by u, v and β. Recalling that contributor 1 joins the contest earlier than contributor 2, any feasible reward discrimination scheme must have β ≥ 1 and u ≥ 1. The impacts of v, u and β on G is provided below. Lemma 5: The discrimination gain G satisfies the following properties.
• G is a decreasing function of v for all v ∈ (0, 1].
• G is an increasing function of u.
• There exists an optimal β =β 3 to maximize G. The relationship between G and v as well as u is now clear. However, it is not intuitive to show the impact of β on G.
Here, a simple example is presented. Suppose that v is 1, the maximum G is obtained at β = 1.5214. In Fig.21, we illustrate the relationship between G and u as well as β in two different cases, v = 1 4 and 1 2 . Observation 3: To achieve a high discrimination gain, the requester needs to configure a small exponent in the contest function. Paradox 3: From observations 2 and 3, we find that the reward discrimination scheme is hardly to achieve both high efficiency and high discrimination gain.
So far, we have identified three paradoxes in the weight, exponent and reward discrimination schemes respectively. Though our study is limited to the case of two competing contributors, these paradoxes usually exist in the crowdsourcing with more than two contributors. Our next purpose is to find an appropriate contest architecture that incentives more effort from the early contributor.
E. Nature-as-a-player in Reward Discrimination Scheme
In the previous analyses, the variable e 0 is 0 by default. Hence, the reward is completely allocated to the contributors, no matter what their effort is. To avoid adversary scenario that all the contributors exert little effort, the requester can introduce nature as a player so to retain a fraction of his reward. This nature player "exerts" a fixed amount of nonzero virtual effort e 0 , while not harvesting any real reward.
After the nature player is introduced, it is plausible that the contributors might not participate (i.e. exerting 0 effort). To solve the NE, we take the derivative of π i over e i . The optimality conditions result in the following (in)equalities at the NE,
From the above (in)equalities, both contributors will exert positive amount of effort at the NE when v < 1. When v = 1 and e 0 ≥ b i , contributors from 1 to i always obtain negative payoffs if they allocate any amount of effort. Their optimal strategy is not to participate in the crowdsensing, which is a sufficient condition. Hence, the requester can use e 0 to control how many rewards are retained and which contributors are awarded. In general, Eqs.(73) do not admit a close-form solution to the NE so that we need to search for e * i iteratively. In the beginning, a vector of values are endowed to e. Given e −i , we compute e i using Eq.(73) for all i. Then, we repeat the above step until eventually e converge to a very small vicinity of the equilibrium.
The analysis of reward discrimination scheme demonstrates that an appropriate configuration of reward ratio is able to bring certain discrimination gain. However, the reward discrimination impairs the efficiency of the requester under many circumstances. Here, our purpose is to investigate whether the reduction of efficiency can be mitigated by introducing the nature player. For analytical tractability, we let b 1 = b 2 = b. Then, there exists a unique symmetric NE that solves the following equation with e * 1 = e * 2 = e * ,
After certain transformations, the solution e * is given by
The above equation yields the relationship between e * and e 0 . Lemma 6: When nature is a player in the contest along with homogeneous ordinary players (i.e. a i = a, b i = b and v i = v for all i), the NE strategy of ordinary players, e * , is a decreasing function of e 0 .
The total reward paid to the contributors is given by
The efficiency of the requester is computed as
e 0 e 0 +2(e * ) v (76) according to Eqs.(74) and (75). The relationship between the efficiency and nature's effort is the following.
Lemma 7: When nature is a player in the contest, the efficiency of requester E is an increasing function of e 0 . The asymptotic efficiency w.r.t. e 0 is given by
For a fixed e 0 , the asymptotic efficiency w.r.t. b is given by
Observation 4: By introducing nature as a player, the efficiency of requester can be improved at most two times.
To pursue the best efficiency, the requester is reasonable to configure e 0 as large as possible. However, a large e 0 leads to less effort from the contributors at the NE. These small effort may incur some challenges in practical applications when the observation of the effort contain noise. To improve the efficiency and to obtain a large utility, the requester needs to configure e 0 and b i (∀i) jointly so that the total reward paid to the contributors equals to the budget B.
F. Brief Summary
We have analyzed the total utility, efficiency and discrimination gain under three schemes: weight discrimination, exponent discrimination and reward discrimination. Our observations can be summarized as below.
• The weight and exponent discrimination schemes are not suitable for timeliness sensitive crowdsourcing contests.
• The reward discrimination scheme can achieve certain discrimination gain, but risks the potential reduction of the requester's efficiency.
• By introducing a nature player, the requester's efficiency can be improved, while incurring great difficulty of configuring the maximum achievable rewards and the nature player's effort jointly. The optimal incentive mechanism is very difficult to obtain due to its freedom in choosing the shape of contest success function and configuring coupled parameters. Based on our observations, the appropriate incentive mechanism should bear the form 
This implies that the increase of v 2 causes the increase of the right-hand in Eq.(68). We split the left-hand of Eq.(68) into two parts as follows.
P art 2 = (e * 2 ) (v1−v2+1) + (e * 2 ) (v2−v1+1) .
Given a fixed e * 2 , as v 2 increases, P art 1 becomes smaller for sure. For a fixed e * 2 , the first expression in P art 2 is a decreasing function of v 2 , while the second one is an increasing function of v 2 . We take the derivative of P art 2 over v 2 , dP art 2 dv 2 = (e * 2 ) (v2−v1+1) − (e * 2 ) (v1−v2+1) log(e * 2 ) > 0 (81) no matter whether e * 2 is greater than 1 or not. When v 2 increases, the right-hand of Eq.(68) increases, while the lefthand decreases if e * 2 does not change. In order to make the equality hold, e * 2 must increase. Therefore, increasing v j will improve the effort exerted by the both contributors.
B. Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: i) It is easy to see that E is a decreasing function of u.
ii) We take the first-order derivative of E over β,
where Denominator is a positive expression. We further subtract the numerator denoted by F β from the above equation, F β = uβ 1+v − uvβ 2+2v + uvβ + uβ − β 1+v − vβ 1+2v − β 1+2v + v. When β is slightly above the minimum value (i.e. 1), F β is approximated by 2u − 2 which is greater than 0. Then, E is an increasing function of β in this situation. When β is sufficiently large, F β is negative so that E is a decreasing function of β. Hence, due to the continuity of E, there may exist one or more local extreme points. In what follows, we will show that there exists a unique extreme point to let F β = 0.
Let G β be the derivative of F β over β. There has
where it is 0 at the extreme points. Suppose Fβ = 0 at the point β =β 1 . Subtracting G β from F β at the extreme point β 1 , we obtain
due toβ 1 ≥ 1, and the equality holds atβ 1 = 1. Thus, the above inequality yields Gβ 1 < 0 for anyβ 1 > 1. In the small vicinity ofβ 1 , there must have F β > 0 if β <β 1 and F β < 0 if β >β 1 . We next prove the uniqueness ofβ 1 . Suppose that there are two extreme points. Then, one must be the local maximum and the other must be the local minimum. Denote byβ 1 . This contradicts to the assumption that there are two extreme points. The uniqueness ofβ 1 means that there is only one extreme point in E.
iii) We take the derivative of E over v, dE dv = (β 1+v + β 1+2v − vβ 1+2v log(β) + β v + v log(β) + 1)
We denote by F v = β 1+v + β 1+2v − vβ 1+2v log(β) + β v + v log(β)+1. When v is small enough (i.e. v is approaching 0), F v is approximated 2(1 + β) which is greater than 0. Thus, E is an increasing function of v when it is small. When v approaches 1 and β is sufficiently large, F v is negative so that E is a decreasing function of v. Due to the continuity of F v , it is plausible that F v crosses 0 as v increases from 0 to 1. Suppose that there exists a constantv so to have Fv = 0. Denote a new expression G v that is the derivative of F v over v,
Because of Fv = 0, there must have Gv = −v(log(β)) 2 (1 + β 1+2v ) < 0. Hence, the extreme pointv can only be the local maximum of the efficiency function E. As v increases from 0 tov, E increases first, and decreases after v continue to increase beyondv. When β is not large enough, F v may be always positive so that E always increases with regard to v.
C. Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: i) We first take the derivative of G over v and obtain dG dv = 4(log β)(uβ v+1 + β v )(1 − β 2v+1 )
(1 + β v+1 ) 2 (1 + β v ) 2 (1 + u) < 0.
Therefore, the discrimination gain is a decreasing function of the exponent v when other coefficients are fixed. When v = 1, the minimum G is obtained by 4(uβ 2 +β) (1+β 2 )(1+β)(1+u) ; when v → 0, the maximum G is approximated by 2(1+uβ) (1+β)(1+u) .
ii) The derivative of G over u is given by
and the equality holds at β = 1. Hence, as u grows, the discrimination gain G increases correspondingly, which strengthens the effect of reward discrimination scheme. The asymptotic gain is expressed as
(1 + β v )(1 + β 1+v ) .
iii) We further take the derivative of above expression over β and compute the optimalβ 3 to maximize the discrimination gain. Here,β 3 is the unique feasible solution to an implicit equation,
Therefore, according to Eqs.(89) and (89), the asymptotic discrimination gain increases with β first until reaching the maximum value, and then decreases as β further increases.
D. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof: We prove this lemma by contradiction. We take the derivative of e * over e 0 in Eq.(74), Hence, e * is a strictly decreasing function of e 0 for e * ≥ 0 and e 0 ≥ 0.
E. Proof of Lemma 7
Proof: The first argument is a direct result of Lemma 6. When e 0 increases, e * decreases such that E becomes larger and larger. For v ∈ (0, 1), as e 0 grows to infinity, e * approaches 0. For v = 1, when e 0 is infinitely close to b − , e * also approaches 0. Then, the asymptotic efficiency w.r.t. e 0 is vw(1+u) 2u
. When e 0 is fixed and b increases to infinity, e * also increases to infinity. Then, E decreases until
according to Eq.(76).
